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In both the Pacific War against Japan from 1941 to 1945 and the Korean War 
from 1950 to 1953, United States combat troops—emboldened by a combat culture of 
dehumanization through racism and a military that enacted policies of attrition—
committed atrocities against Asian soldiers and civilians. This trend continued into the 
Vietnam War unabated beginning in 1965. Incidents of atrocities committed by American 
troops overseas were not publicly discussed until the My Lai Massacre of 1968 was 
revealed to the American people in 1969. Once the massacre became a national news 
story published in outlets all over the country, American citizens were forced to confront 
the reality of what some US combat troops had done in Asian wars for decades. 
This thesis argues that the media coverage of the My Lai Massacre broke a culture 
of silence, a phenomenon previously observed in military circles, that existed in 
American society concerning atrocities committed by GIs in American wars in Asia 
during the mid-twentieth century. Myths of American righteousness abroad and the 
morally good GI were challenged by liberal doves who reconciled the reality of My Lai 
with their national identity and called for a collective acceptance of responsibility by 
Americans. In contrast, a large contingent of war hawks, unwilling to let the overarching 
myth of American exceptionalism fade, defended and incorporated American war 
atrocities into those ideas. War atrocities and the myth of American exceptionalism 
iv 
 
persist in the wake of My Lai, but the culture of silence has diminished as Americans 
continue to reconcile atrocities with their wars.
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 In the Vietnam War in 1968, the United States Army, reeling from the Tet 
Offensive, struggled to dismantle National Liberation Front (NLF) operations in South 
Vietnam. A particular hotspot of Communist activity was a region in the northeastern 
Quang Ngai Province known by the South Vietnamese as Son My Village. Colloquially 
referred to by GIs as “Pinkville,” Son My was composed of a collection of subhamlets 
that included My Lai 4, My Khe 4, Binh Tay, Binh Dong, and others. As part of a 
sequence of search-and-destroy operations in Quang Ngai conducted by the newly 
formed Task Force Baker under the moniker “Operation Muscatine,” Son My was 
assaulted by US combat troops from Company B and Company C on March 16. They 
expected to wipe out the remnants of the NLF’s 48th Local Force Battalion while the 
civilians were away at market. After initial artillery shelling and helicopter gunfire 
softened the village, over 100 GIs from Task Force Baker began a ground sweep of Son 
My. As far as the press and task-force headquarters were concerned, the day’s operation 
concluded with 128 NLF dead and three weapons found “in a bloody day-long battle” 
with no American deaths.1 It was a definitive success. In reality, however, 504 unarmed 
civilians—almost all women, children, and the elderly—were murdered by US soldiers in 
 
1 Quoted in Seth Robson, “Clemency is Last Hope for a More Normal Life,” Stars and Stripes, 
May 12, 2009, https://www.stripes.com/news/clemency-is-last-hope-for-a-more-normal-life-1.91416; 




Son My that day. Much of the killing occurred at the My Lai 4 subhamlet and the trail 
leading up to it under orders from Second Lieutenant William Laws Calley, Jr., who 
headed 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd 
(Americal) Infantry Division.2 
 Some officers and hundreds of other GIs in Task Force Baker learned the truth of 
what happened within weeks, but few outside the Army knew what transpired until ex-GI 
Ronald Ridenhour sent letters in late March, 1969, to the State Department, the White 
House, the Pentagon, and twenty-four congressmen in both the House and the Senate that 
described the “dark and bloody” murders.3 Ridenhour was not a part of Task Force 
Baker, but he heard of the incident from witnesses as part of a reconnaissance unit in 
Vietnam shortly after it occurred. The Army conducted its own internal investigations 
into the matter and eventually charged William Calley, Jr., with the murder of 109 
unarmed South Vietnamese civilians on September 5, 1969. It was only in November 
1969 that the media and American public at large learned of the massacre at Son My, 
now commonly known in the US as the “My Lai Massacre.” Investigative reporter 
Seymour Hersh broke the story on November 13 with the publication of his article 
“Lieutenant Accused of Murdering 109 Civilians” in the Boston Globe, Miami Herald, 
Chicago Sun-Times, and other outlets. The events of the My Lai Massacre finally 
achieved national attention on November 20 with the publication of both Hersh’s second 
article, “Hamlet Attack Called ‘Point-Blank Murder,’” and the Cleveland Plain Dealer’s 
 
 2 Hersh, “The Massacre at My Lai”; Howard Jones, My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into 
Darkness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1-3, 27-29. Jones notes that official figures are 
contested, but 504 is accepted by most as an accurate count of the victims at My Lai. William Thomas 
Allison, My Lai: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 
2012), 52. 
3 Quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath (New 
York: Random House, 1970), 103, 106. 
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publication of eight photographs taken by Ronald Haeberle, an Army photographer 
present at My Lai 4, that depicted graphic images of the victims before and after their 
murder.4 
 In the same month, Lieutenant General William Peers was assigned by the Army 
to direct a panel that would determine what happened at My Lai and why initial inquiries 
into the incident in 1968 failed to bring attention and consequences onto the perpetrators. 
The Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai 
Incident, or simply “The Peers Inquiry,” conducted dozens of interviews of perpetrators 
and officers involved with the affair. In its final report on March 17, 1970, to Army Chief 
of Staff William Westmoreland and Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, the Peers 
Inquiry concluded, “Within the Americal Division, at every command level from 
company to division, actions were taken or omitted which together effectively concealed 
the Son My incident,” and some of those actions “constituted deliberate suppression or 
withholding of information.”5 
 The indifference with which the My Lai Massacre was treated for over a year, its 
suppression by both members involved and officers in the Army, and its revelation to the 
public by media outlets is part of a larger story of relations between American combat 
troops, American civilians, and the US government concerning atrocities in Asian wars 
during the twentieth century. The United States fought the Japanese in World War II 
from 1941-1945 and the North Koreans and troops from the People’s Republic of China 
 
4 Jones, My Lai, 205-214; Hersh, “The Massacre at My Lai.” 
5 Peers Inquiry, Volume I, The Report of the Investigation, 2-9, Report of the Department of the 
Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident, 1970, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Peers_inquiry.html; Michal R. Belknap, The 
Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley (Kansas: The 
University Press of Kansas, 2002), 78-79; Hersh, “The Massacre at My Lai.” 
4 
 
in the Korean War from 1950-1953. In both wars, American soldiers committed atrocities 
against soldiers and civilians alike. It was not until the My Lai Massacre of 1968 during 
the Vietnam War, however, that an instance of US soldiers violating the laws of warfare 
and cultural mores garnered substantial media coverage and sparked a national 
conversation. Americans at home confronted the reality that some of their own troops 
flagrantly murdered unarmed civilians—women, children, and the elderly—by the scores. 
 If My Lai was not the first instance of an atrocity committed in the Vietnam War, 
or the Korean War, or the Pacific War, why was My Lai the first to garner national 
attention? What does the media scrutiny of My Lai in tandem with public engagement 
imply about the relationship between the US military and the American people before, 
during, and after? Through the public coverage of the My Lai Massacre, myth and reality 
converged in American society as a culture of silence surrounding American war 
atrocities in Asia broke. Conceptions of American righteousness and the morally good GI 
eroded in the minds of antiwar doves and liberal Americans who let go of the myth of 
American exceptionalism. These doves reconciled the reality of the My Lai Massacre 
with their national identity and called on their peers to accept collective guilt and 
responsibility. War hawks and pro-military advocates, however, reinforced the myth of 
American exceptionalism in the wake of My Lai by defending the massacre and 
incorporating the occurrence of atrocities into the image of the good GI and American 
righteousness. While attempts at collective reckoning failed and the myth of American 
exceptionalism remains, the culture of silence surrounding American atrocities dissipated 
due, in part, to the media’s coverage of My Lai. Atrocities, when discovered, now 
5 
 
become national topics of conversation in mainstream news media, and Americans 





FROM THE PACIFIC TO MY LAI 
  
 Given the proper context, the My Lai Massacre was wholly predictable. The 
history of racially-tinged acts of violence by US troops against Asians abroad can be 
traced back to the Philippine-American War in the beginning of the twentieth century.6 
Since this study only focuses on the actions of US soldiers over a thirty-four year period 
that encompasses the Pacific War of World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam 
War, there is still room, then, for a study that effectively incorporates the Philippine-
American War into the discussion of US atrocities against Asians in the twentieth century 
and the media coverage of My Lai. Regardless, the historical record confirms that 
atrocities committed by GIs against Asians were not a phenomenon that began with My 
Lai; they were a pattern of action that culminated in the event. Furthermore, a culture of 
silence existed among US troops, citizens, and the news media. This silence maintained 
an image of morally good GIs that developed through the Pacific War, the Korean War, 
and the Vietnam War before My Lai.   
 Though atrocity is often used in the monographs and academic articles referenced 
in this thesis, the term is rarely defined by its users. Alan Kramer notes in the 
 
6 For instances of atrocities committed by US soldiers during the Philippine-American War of 
1899-1902 and evidence of their racial nature, see Paul A. Kramer, “Race-Making and Colonial Violence 





International Encyclopedia of the First World War that an atrocity is, “an act of violence 
condemned by contemporaries as a breach of morality or the laws of war” and is 
“culturally constructed.”7 Therefore, the condemnation of an instance of violence that is 
perceived as unusually immoral indicates its status as an atrocity. An atrocity does not 
need to be scrutinized through laws of warfare to exist, only when it is to be punished by 
law. It is important to understand this distinction. Atrocities by American troops occurred 
throughout the Pacific War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, whether labeled by 
actors, victims, witnesses, other contemporaries, or scrutinized through the lens of the 
Hague Convention of 1907 or the Geneva Convention of 1949.8 These atrocities include 
corpse looting, rape, torture, and the shooting of both unarmed civilians and disarmed 
combatants.9 
 Regardless, the word “atrocity” is a messy term burdened with a seemingly 
endless amount of lingual, cultural, and contextual baggage. For instance, using Alan 
Kramer’s definition, questions arise: if an act of violence would be rationally condemned 
by contemporaries as a breach of morality if the act were known about, can it still be 
defined as an atrocity? This thesis assumes so. If one society does not condemn a violent 
 
7 Alan Kramer, “Atrocity,” in International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute 
Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson (Freie 
Universität Berlin, 2017), doi: 10.15463/ie1418.10770/1.1. 
8 See Hague Convention of 1907: Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague IV 
(October 18, 1907), Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, in The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp#art4; See Jones, My Lai, 16. 
9 Eugene B. Sledge, With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa (1981; reprint, New York: 
Presidio Press, 2007) Kindle, 65, 119-22, 145-47, 151-52, 289-90. Corpse looting was a common 
occurrence that Sledge recognizes was “dehumanizing,” “savage,” and a product of hatred; Richard 
Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary (1943; reprint, New York: Modern Library, 2000), 126-29; Craig M. 
Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 
1941-1951 (1994; reprint, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 126; Bruce Cumings, The 
Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010) 167-69, 196-99; Jones, My Lai, 4. Jones 
references the work of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group. 
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act broadly, but another society does (a perpetrator-victim scenario), does the act 
constitute an atrocity? This thesis contends it does for the sake of using words and 
defining them, but perhaps there is an argument against such a liberal use of the term. 
Accounting for scale, this thesis utilizes “atrocity” to describe a wide range of acts that 
encompass the torture of prisoners and the firebombing of Tokyo. While this thesis 
defines these acts under the same umbrella term of “atrocities,” this does not imply that 
they carry the same weight in terms of impact, victims, or reception by contemporaries. 
They are, however, both considered atrocities here. Furthermore, a violent act’s 
descriptive definition does not preclude it from being in atrocity as this thesis utilizes the 
term. For instance, a massacre and an instance of corpse-looting are both atrocities even 
though they can be described without referring to them as such. Finally, this thesis’ use of 
the messy term of “atrocity” does not preclude other scholars from defining it differently 
if they see fit. In this thesis, the term “atrocity” carries the context established in these 
last two paragraphs forward and liberally applies the term. 
 Historians John Dower and Craig Cameron show that atrocities committed by US 
troops in the Pacific War were connected to racist sentiments prevalent in the West 
toward Asians at the time. Racism during the twentieth century toward Asians was a 
common feature of Western culture rooted in a history of colonialism and the Yellow 
Peril.10 Dower pioneered the argument in his 1986 monograph, War Without Mercy: Race 
and Power in the Pacific War, that the United States was not only culpable of its own 
 
10 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1986), 8-10; Cameron, American Samurai, 89-90, 92; Craig M. Cameron, “Race and Identity: The 
Culture of Combat in the Pacific War,” International History Review 27, no. 3 (2005): 550-51, 554-58, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109606. In this article, Cameron expands on his view that Western relegation 
of Asian territories to colonial status under a guise of Western cultural (and racial) superiority before and 
through the interwar period partially instigated the Pacific War. 
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crimes in the Pacific War, but that the motivation for those atrocities and the viciousness 
of fighting in combat were motivated by “race hatred” that was transferred to other Asian 
adversaries during the Cold War.11  
 Cameron proposes in his 1994 monograph, American Samurai: Myth, 
Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941-1951, that 
racism was a feature of combat culture among US Marines in the Pacific and Korea. 
Racist myths that presumed Asian cultural and racial inferiority to Western whites were 
reinforced in boot camp, developed among Marines on Guadalcanal and Peleliu under 
strenuous jungle warfare, and manifested fully on Okinawa and later the Korean War 
with a devastating number of civilian deaths.12 Myths of race that permeated American 
society, in this case, were the impetus for combat troops to dehumanize Asians. 
Dehumanization made atrocities easier to commit and more regular, according to 
Cameron.13 
 Two Pacific War memoirs referenced by Dower and Cameron in their research 
more clearly portray how racial animus and combat culture manifested among US 
soldiers fighting the Japanese. Eugene Sledge’s 1981memoir, With the Old Breed: At 
Peleliu and Okinawa, details his firsthand experience as a US Marine in Company K, 3d 
Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division during the battles of Peleliu and 
Okinawa in 1944 and 1945, respectively, and exemplifies the race hatred described by 
Dower and Cameron on both sides in the Pacific War. In describing his “brutish” and 
 
11 Dower, War Without Mercy, 3-73, 77-190, 293-317. 
12 Cameron, American Samurai, 7-8, 51-52, 89-94, 170-72, 187-90, 230-36. Cameron notes that 
there were 80,000 to 160,000 Okinawan civilian casualties in the Marine invasion of the island, a result 
only achieved because Marines had “created the necessary attitudes and conditions to wage an 
exterminationist campaign.” 
13 Cameron, American Samurai, 7-8, 51-52, 89-94, 170-72, 187-90, 230-36. 
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“inglorious” experiences, Sledge acknowledges a racial animus existed that generated 
heinous violence.14 Corpse looting was a common occurrence that Sledge recognizes was 
“dehumanizing,” “savage,” and a product of hatred that existed between the Marines and 
Japanese, though combat stress may have contributed.15 Racist language was 
commonplace as Sledge recalls different Marines referring to the Japanese as “slant-eyed 
bastards” or “slant-eyed yellow bastards,” not to mention the derogatory colloquial 
“Jap.”16 Sledge witnessed atrocities on both sides, including: the removal of a gold tooth 
from a paralyzed yet living Japanese soldier by a Marine with a Ka-Bar; three mutilated 
American corpses—two of which had their heads, hands and genitalia severed, the latter 
shoved into their mouths; the removal of a dead Japanese soldier’s hand by a Marine to 
keep as a souvenir; and the murder of an injured Okinawan civilian by another Marine.17 
 The situation differed little on Guadalcanal while the sentiments remained the 
same. In Richard Tregaskis 1943 memoir, Guadalcanal Diary, Marines sometimes sang 
songs about killing “Japs” or “Nips.”18 As one Marine walked down a trail towards his 
comrades with an unarmed Japanese prisoner, he was greeted with shouts of “Kill the 
bastard!”19 In another instance, a group of Marines delighted in shooting Japanese troops 
who were trying to escape to the shore of the Tenaru River among heaps of their dead 
comrades.20 These descriptions are used by Dower and Cameron to reinforce their claims 
 
14 Sledge, With the Old Breed, 36-37, 317-18. Note that Dower and Cameron utilize this memoir 
in their monographs War Without Mercy and American Samurai, respectively. 
15 Sledge, With the Old Breed, 65, 119-22. 
16 Sledge, With the Old Breed, 109-10, 137-38, 302-03. 
17 Sledge, With the Old Breed, 119-21, 145-47, 151-52, 289-90. 
18 Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary, 4, 72. Note that Dower and Cameron utilize this memoir in their 
monographs War Without Mercy and American Samurai, respectively. 
19 Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary, 107. 
20 Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary, 127-28. 
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that racism was a mechanism of dehumanization and othering used by American GIs in 
the Pacific War to justify atrocities. 
 Overarching military policies that were racialized and attrition-focused failed to 
abate atrocities committed by ground troops. In both American Samurai and his 2005 
essay, “Race and Identity: The Culture of Combat in the Pacific War,” Cameron insists 
the failure to distinguish between civilians and noncombatants in the indiscriminate 
incendiary bombings of the Japanese Home Islands indicate a lower value placed on 
Asian lives relative to whites by US officials.21 Thomas Searle, referencing the 
incendiary bombing of Japanese cities during the Pacific War, notes that “the intention to 
kill large numbers of Japanese civilians was explicitly included in planning documents 
read and approved at every level from the individual airmen to the Joint Chiefs of Staff” 
in his 2002 article, “‘It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing 
of Tokyo in March 1945.”22 This “race-tinged revenge” for Pearl Harbor, as Williamson 
Murray and Allan Millet describe the incendiary bombings of Japan in their 2000 
monograph, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, compound with the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as ample evidence of the disregard for 
Japanese civilians’ lives among policymakers.23 
 Just as a racialized combat culture contributed to atrocities committed by 
American troops in the Pacific War, Bruce Cumings and Sahr Conway-Lanz show that 
this trend extends to the Korean War. Cumings argues in The Korean War: A History, 
 
21 Cameron, American Samurai, 4; Cameron, “Race and Identity,” 550-51, 554-58, 561-62. 
22 Thomas R. Searle, “‘It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers’: The Firebombing of 
Tokyo in March 1945,” The Journal of Military History 66, no. 1 (2002): 103-05, 108-09, 117-19, 121, 
133, doi:10.2307/2677346. 
23 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War 
(Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2000), viii, 168, 506-07. 
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published in 2010, that US policy and combat culture during the Korean War was racist 
and conducive to an environment of civilian massacre, the largest example being Nogun-
ri.24 Instances of the slitting of civilians’ throats and rape of Korean women by GIs were 
undergirded by a pervasive racial language that American troops used to dehumanize 
Korean “gook[s]”.25 As for US military policy, the air war conducted against the North 
Koreans during the Korean War, similar to the Pacific War with its use of incendiaries 
and targeting of urban centers, is labeled a “genocide” by Cumings who utilizes the 
United Nation’s Genocide Convention’s definition.26 Conway-Lanz shows in his 2006 
monograph, Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity after 
World War II, that civilian deaths like those at Nogun-ri occurred under a policy that 
allowed for the shooting of Korean refugees.27 Atrocities committed by GIs in the Korean 
War reflected on American society “where Koreans were ‘people of color’ subjected to 
apartheid-like restrictions.”28 
 In the Vietnam War, GIs commonly perceived the Vietnamese as inferior. Kyle 
Longley argues in Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam, published in 2008, 
that dehumanization of the Vietnamese, indoctrination, and improper training at boot 
camp prepared soldiers “to kill when ordered” without the capacity to distinguish 
 
24 Cumings, The Korean War, 14-15, 149-61, 167-70, 196-99; See Cameron, American Samurai, 
234-35; The story of the massacre of hundreds of North Korean civilians by American GIs in the opening 
weeks of the Korean War in 1950 at the Nogun-ri village broke in 1999. One perpetrator that fired into 
scores of huddled civilians under a bridge said, “We just annihilated them.” Associated Press, “G.I.’s Tell 
of a U.S. Massacre in Korean War,” The New York Times, Sept. 30, 1999, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/30/world/gi-s-tell-of-a-us-massacre-in-korean-war.html; See Richard 
Pyle, “Ex-GIs Say U.S. Troops in Korean War had Orders to Shoot Civilians,” Star-Banner, Nov. 22, 2000, 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=20001122&id=LwJQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=XggEAAAA
IBAJ&pg=6810,3364381. 
25 Cumings, The Korean War, 14-15, 169-70, 197. 
26 Cumings, The Korean War, 149-61 
27 See Sahr Conway-Lanz, Collateral Damage: Americans, Noncombatant Immunity, and Atrocity 
after World War II (Routledge, 2006). 
28 Cumings, The Korean War, 15. 
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between combatants and civilians.29 Indeed, Longley notes that officers in basic training 
would shout at their trainees to “Kill, kill, kill the gooks!”30 This mantra reflects the 
mindset of some GIs toward Vietnamese during the My Lai Massacre. Private First Class 
Dennis Bunning, referring to the slaughtered Vietnamese, recalled to the Peers 
commission that perpetrators “didn’t even consider them human.”31 
 The racist parallels of combat against the Vietnamese and Japanese by American 
troops is invoked by one anonymous GI in Vietnam who proclaims in Michael Herr’s 
1977 memoir, Dispatches, that it was “just like goin’ in against the Japs.”32 The 
consequences of racial dehumanization manifested fully when Vietnamese civilians, 
referred to as “Dinks” in this instance, tried to escape gunfire by entering a helicopter 
with GIs only to be shot at by the troops.33 One Marine prior to this instance was upset 
that he was prohibited from firing through villages to avoid civilian crossfire.34 The 
racialized combat culture among US troops during the Pacific War and the Korean War 
remained in Vietnam, as did its tendency to produce atrocities. 
 Military policy in Vietnam also contributed to an environment where atrocities 
regularly occurred, though not on the scale of My Lai. Thomas Thayer and Gregory 
Daddis establish in War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (1985) 
and No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam 
War (2011), respectively, that US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)’s 
improper use of attrition metrics for its counterinsurgency campaign—that is, measuring 
 
29 Kyle Longley, Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam (Armonk, New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2008), 41-47, 62-64. 
30 Longley, Grunts, 63. 
31 Quoted in Jones, My Lai, 77. 
32 Michael Herr, Dispatches (1977; reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 1991) Kindle, 23. 
33 Herr, Dispatches, 29. 
34 Herr, Dispatches, 27-28. 
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success by the number of NLF soldiers killed—was responsible for the over one million 
civilian casualties during the conflict.35 For his 2003 monograph, Patriots: The Vietnam 
War Remembered from All Sides, Christian Appy interviewed 350 people to tell the story 
of the war from the perspective of individuals who participated, one of whom 
corroborates MACV’s culpability in civilian casualties.36 As a whole, these studies show 
that the three polices of the “free fire zone,” “search and destroy” missions, and MACV’s 
idea of measuring “progress” in the war through body counts resulted in a combat culture 
where civilian deaths were excused, unpunished, and statistically beneficial for squads 
who would report civilian deaths as enemy dead, just as Task Force Baker did at My 
Lai.37 
 The works of scholars and the memoirs of veterans reveal that combat culture and 
policy regularly combined to produce atrocities over three decades of warfare in Asia. 
The My Lai Massacre, however, remains the most consequential of these atrocities in 
terms of its scale and relevance as a national scandal during the divisive Vietnam War. 
The facts and timeline of the massacre and its aftermath are well-documented at this 
point. Historians in the past two decades are more concerned with My Lai’s significance 
and proper interpretation. In The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the 
Court Martial of Lieutenant Calley (2002), Michal Belknap examines Lt. Calley’s 
publicized court martial as a site of political debate between hawks and doves. Belknap 
 
35 Thomas C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (1985; reprint, 
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 125-33, 257; Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. 
Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) Kindle, 
5-6, 8-10 
36 Christian G. Appy, Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides (New York: 
Penguin, 2003), xv-xvi, 349-52. 
37 Michael Bernhardt, quoted in Appy, Patriots, 350; Daddis, No Sure Victory, 5-6, 8-10; See also 
Jones, My Lai, 24-25. 
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shows that the Vietnam war effort and faith in the federal government were undermined 
in the eyes of hawks who viewed Calley as a patriot abandoned by the Army and doves 
who viewed Calley as a scapegoat for higher-ups more responsible.38 Unlike Belknap, 
this thesis examines the responses of hawks and doves to the immediate revelations of 
My Lai in news outlets rather than focusing on the trial of Lt. Calley. 
 The media coverage of My Lai and what it shows about how Americans viewed 
themselves is the topic of Kendrick Oliver’s 2003 article, “Atrocity, Authenticity, and 
American Exceptionalism: (Ir)rationalising the Massacre at My Lai.” Oliver argues that 
the national discussion surrounding the My Lai Massacre brought up shame and 
questions of national identity that were (ir)rationalized by Americans who categorized the 
incident in one of three ways: a one-off event, an event indicative of American culture, or 
an event indicative of the nature of man in warfare.39 Specifically, the tragedy brought up 
concerns and questions over the traditional notion of American exceptionalism and the 
righteousness of the United States’ cause in Vietnam.40 Rather than Oliver’s three 
categorizations, this thesis categorizes reactions to the massacre under two umbrellas: 
hawks who incorporated the massacre into existing myths of American exceptionalism 
and the good GI, and antiwar doves who let those myths fade and called for collective 
responsibility for the massacre. However, this thesis aligns with Oliver’s conclusion that 
the massacre’s effect on the national character is questionable given the still-present myth 
of American exceptionalism and its continued espousal by public officials.41 
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 Claude Cookman also analyzes the media coverage of the My Lai Massacre in his 
2007 article, “An American Atrocity: The My Lai Massacre Concretized in a Victim's 
Face,” but his study is relegated to the public reaction of photographs taken of victims, 
particularly combat photographer Ron Haeberle’s photograph of seven victims moments 
before their brutal murder.42 Cookman shows that public comments on the photographs 
included dismissal, disbelief, and comparisons to war crimes perpetrated by the Nazis—
reactions that this thesis also finds in Chapter 3.43 Like Oliver, Cookman recognizes that 
public rejection and disbelief of the photographs were founded in mythical notions of 
American exceptionalism.44 Cookman concludes with a call to action for the reader, 
“Contemplating the picture and accepting our responsibility as citizens in whose name 
the Vietnam War was waged can be an act of contrition.”45 This thesis agrees with 
Cookman that collective responsibility by Americans for atrocities in their wars is 
necessary for effective mitigation and change in institutions, a point discussed more in-
depth in the next two chapters. Indeed, William Allison notes in his 2012 monograph, My 
Lai: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War, that an “unwillingness to take 
responsibility” for the My Lai Massacre “continues to haunt the American conscience.”46 
 Currently, Howard Jones’ 2017 monograph, My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the 
Descent into Darkness, stands as the most comprehensive and encompassing scholarly 
work pertaining to the My Lai Massacre. Memory is brought up once again as a “crucial” 
part of engagement with the My Lai Massacre, along with the point that the massacre 
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dispels the myth of American exceptionalism whether it persists in society today or not.47 
Jones contends past scholarship by giving multiple examples in which the Army has 
acted to change its rules, regulations, and culture to mitigate atrocities since My Lai.48 
Still, he argues these actions failed to prevent American atrocities in the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and accountability remains lacking.49 Jones argues My Lai was also a 
“turning point” because “it tarnished the image many Americans had of their soldiers, 
and that soldiers had of themselves.”50 The image Jones is referencing is the same that 
Cookman insists is a “cherished myth” of the good GI (what Cookman calls “the 
perfectly balanced American “warrior”), one that is “fierce in battle but chivalrous 
toward noncombatants.” 51 But where did this image come from? 
 The myth of the good GI developed in American society and was reinforced in 
news media coverage of American wars before My Lai. In his 2004 article, “Kilroy is 
Back: Images of American Soldiers in Korea, 1950-1053,” Andrew Huebner argues that 
the image of the “tough, dependable, patriotic GI” was propagated by journalists, 
officials, and filmmakers during World War II and was remobilized for the Korean 
War.52 Cameron notes that elitism was incorporated into this image of Marines who were 
advertised during World War I as “First to Fight” by recruiters.53 The idea of American 
fighting-men as exceptionally strong, brave, adventurous saviors appealed to traditional 
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masculine values and the gender roles of men, along with notions of American 
righteousness in warfare.54 
 As Robert Self shows in All in the Family: The Realignment of American 
Democracy Since the 1960s (2012), the common embodiment and representation of an 
American male in this period was white, middle-class, heterosexual, and patriotic.55 
Military service, masculine values, and the good GI image became inseparable in the 
minds of Americans during the twentieth century until, by 1965, “soldiering” was one of 
three pillars of masculinity for American men—the others being breadwinning and 
heterosexuality.56 John Wayne movies like Sands of Iwo Jima and other Hollywood films 
of the 1940s and 1950s informed young men that service and combat was essential to 
being a man; therefore, being a GI became a “rite of passage into manhood” that was 
reinforced by the government through Cold War conscription.57 
 The federal government and media tapped into masculine values to appeal to men 
and mobilize a war effort for World War II and the Cold War that followed. 
Nevertheless, atrocities were committed by GIs and continued to be committed by GIs in 
Asian conflicts. How did the positive image of the good GI develop before My Lai, and 
why were the GI and his actions perceived as “good” by the public? The answer lies in 
how the news media covered these wars. Huebner argues in The Warrior Image: Soldiers 
in American Culture from the Second World War to the Vietnam Era (2008) that World 
War II was where most Americans first encountered images of soldiers in war, though 
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images were encountered to a lesser degree after the First World War.58 The news media, 
according to Huebner, wanted readers and viewers to sympathize and identify with 
soldiers.59 Although the GI of World War II was portrayed as “tough, manly, and 
confident,” more graphic images appeared in the news after 1943 in order to garner 
public sympathy for the war.60 
 The image of the good GI evolved during the Korean War. Unlike in World War 
II coverage, GIs were shown crying and emotional in the Korean War. These sentiments 
of vulnerability were incorporated into a new masculinity wherein combat troops bore the 
weight of suffering for all Americans under strenuous conditions and a sometimes 
apathetic government.61 In his 2005 article, “Rethinking American Press Coverage of the 
Vietnam War, 1965-68,” Huebner contends that World War II imagery of “skill, 
toughness, commitment, and compassion” was used to depict the GI in Vietnam before 
coverage transitioned to depict him as a sympathetic victim of policy, environment, and 
combat as he was portrayed in Korea.62 
 Government censorship of the media also contributed to how the GI was 
portrayed to the public and why American atrocities failed to become the subject of 
national conversation until the press coverage of My Lai. The Office of War Information 
generated much of the propaganda surrounding the myth of the good GI during World 
War II, but George Roader, Jr., argues in his 1993 book, The Censored War: American 
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Visual Experience During World War Two, that withholding information was a strategy 
used by the US government to mobilize the home front and maintain a narrative of 
righteous legitimacy.63 Censorship continued into the Korean War, and Huebner notes in 
The Warrior Image that the Public Information Office issued press releases to “compete 
with images of the exhausted American GI.”64 Steven Casey argues in Selling the Korean 
War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950-1953 (2008) that the limited-war 
strategy of Korea kept the atrocities in the conflict away from press coverage, an 
observation that leaders used as a template for Vietnam.65 The government censorship 
was a success. Though there was some contemporary evidence available to the public that 
prisoners of war (POWs) were mistreated by US troops in Korea, Huebner suggests “the 
notion that American GIs could be war criminals was by no means part of the prevailing 
image in the 1950s.”66 
 Unlike World War II and the Korean War, there was no official censorship of the 
media during the Vietnam War.67 Nevertheless, the government pressured the media to be 
on its side. After a CBS correspondent questioned the burning of the village of Cam Ne 
by US troops in an August 1965 report, President Lyndon Johnson questioned CBS 
president Frank Stanton on a telephone call, “Are you trying to fuck me?”68 Regardless, 
government pressure was not needed to achieve compliance. Huebner shows in 
“Rethinking American Press Coverage” that before the Tet Offensive, “even those 
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journalists who questioned American methods in Vietnam rarely challenged the 
American presence there…The media, like the public, generally supported Cold War 
anticommunism….”69 In the first few years of the Vietnam War, Americans were 
presented with honorable, virtuous, and sympathetic GIs that embodied traditional 
masculine values.70 As Daniel Hallin explains in The “Uncensored War”: The Media and 
Vietnam (1986), the media had become a more progressive, professionalized, and free 
institution that sometimes countered government interests since the Korean War, but it 
nevertheless remained limited to traditional ideologies and connections to the 
government.71 
 Still, a part of this story of atrocities committed by GIs in Asian wars, the image 
of the good GI, American citizens, the press, and the institution of the military is missing. 
The press did not cover American atrocities in any substantial way due to censorship 
before the Vietnam War and a general belief in American righteousness through 1968.72 
The military instituted an attrition-based policy while maintaining an image of 
righteousness that it could not compromise without hindering war efforts and political 
favor. Yet atrocities were committed by GIs in these Asian wars, and they were known 
about by perpetrators and those close to them. So why were they not being publicly 
discussed? Why had servicemen and military officials not come forward to the press, and 
why were atrocities being ignored? 
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 In Patriots, Appy failed to obtain interviews from some veterans because “there 
are things some people will not share.”73 One veterans’ wife attempted to convince him 
to share a story with Appy that was haunting him, but he refused.74 Another ex-pilot who 
was shot down and surrounded by enemy troops before being rescued said he would not 
tell Appy what happened before the helicopter arrived because, “If I tell you, I won’t 
sleep.”75 At the end of the book, Appy interviews Toshio Whelchel, a Japanese American 
who discovered later in life that his half-brother had served in Vietnam and lied to his 
family, saying he had been stationed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, at the time. When Whelchel 
asked his half-brother about his time in Vietnam, he apparently replied, “No. I can’t talk 
to you about it. I don’t want to talk about it.”76 
 Appy was confronted with the culture of silence, a pattern of behavior and 
thinking that characterized the identifiable group of combat veterans relating to their 
wartime experiences, particularly atrocities. Ron Eyerman, in his 2019 monograph on 
cultural sociology, Memory, Trauma, and Identity, explicitly notes that a “culture of 
silence and group solidarity” existed in the military and stymied discussion of atrocities 
like My Lai.77 Veterans, for reasons including shame or loyalty to comrades, often 
refused to share or talk about their experiences when they returned home. In War Without 
Fronts: The USA in Vietnam (2009), without explicitly naming a culture of silence, Bernd 
Greiner describes the common sentiment among GIs in Vietnam who failed to break the 
silence surrounding the My Lai Massacre, “If we say something, nothing will happen 
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anyway, because atrocities like those in My Lai go on all the time….”78 As a result of the 
culture of silence and press censorship, the myth of the good GI who did not commit 
atrocities and the myth of American righteousness were maintained through World War 
II, the Korean War, and the beginning of the Vietnam War. The media coverage of the 
My Lai Massacre was an instance where the culture of silence broke, and these atrocities 
were finally put at the forefront of national conversation. An examination of this 
coverage modifies Eyerman’s observation by revealing that the culture of silence was not 
only prevalent among GIs; it was reinforced by war hawks and relatives of perpetrators of 
atrocities in the civilian sector who attempted to suppress discussion of the My Lai 
Massacre before and after its revelation. 
 
 






MYTH AND REALITY 
 
Many forces converged in the instance of the My Lai Massacre. A history of a 
racist combat culture and military policies of attrition that resulted in numerous atrocities 
committed by American GIs in three separate Asian wars culminated in a devastating 
massacre of Vietnamese civilians that Americans, informed by the media, were forced to 
confront. From this confrontation, a culture of silence broke, and a discussion of different 
realities emerged. What were American troops actually doing thousands of miles from 
the homeland? Were atrocities already an accepted but unspoken characteristic of 
American wars? What did it mean for American society and the military that a minor 
media outlet, not the government, revealed the story of this atrocity to the public? Along 
with these questions, the image of the good GI and American righteousness abroad—
concepts embedded in notions of American exceptionalism—were challenged and 
defended as Americans struggled to determine who was responsible for the massacre and 
who they were as a people.79 
Before discussing the media coverage of My Lai, however, it is necessary to 
understand that the coverage and reactions did not occur in a vacuum; they were 
influenced and shaped by forces and events pervading the turbulent 1960s that include 
“the anti-war movement, counterculture,” and “the rage of antiauthority among American 
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youth,” argues William Allison.80 The civil rights movement and black power movement 
were in full effect, women in the feminist movement were fighting for sexual freedom 
and gender equality, and the specter of communism and nuclear annihilation still lingered 
on American minds. Television was making in-ways. Distrust of the government grew as 
Americans questioned the point of the Vietnam War, the draft, and the reason for 
thousands of young American men dying overseas. Civil rights leader Martin Luther 
King, Jr., came out against the war in 1967. In 1968, Americans experienced the Tet 
Offensive, the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., the assassination of prominent 
anti-war advocate and Democratic senator Robert F. Kennedy, the moon landing, the 
riots and protests at the chaotic Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and the 
election of President Richard Nixon.81 
By the time revelations of the My Lai Massacre reached the public in November 
1969, Americans were at the end of a tumultuous decade and starkly divided. The 
Vietnam War was the focal point of this division. Conservative hawks advocated a pro-
military stance and continuation of the war in Vietnam while anti-war doves staunchly 
opposed continued military intervention in Vietnam. The latter group displayed their 
dissatisfaction with the war and the federal government by burning draft cards and 
protesting. Just two days after Seymour Hersh published his first article that broke the 
story of My Lai, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee staged the largest anti-war 
demonstration in US history (roughly 500,000 people) in Washington, D.C.82 Earlier that 
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year, Americans were confronted with the story of Green Beret Colonel Robert Rheault 
and six of his officers who were charged with the murder of an alleged Vietnamese spy. 
Their charges were soon dropped by Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor because CIA 
operatives would not cooperate for testimony. During this lesser scandal, hawks and 
doves interpreted the event to fit their narratives. For hawks, the charges were evidence 
of an unsupportive and apathetic Army. For Doves, it was evidence of the illegitimacy of 
the United States in Vietnam.83 
In examining responses to My Lai revelations, then, it is important to understand 
that opinions were formulated and ideas about the information were interpreted within the 
context of the 1960s and through the writers’ already-held beliefs about Vietnam and the 
military. Hawks were already prone to supporting the combat troops involved, dismissing 
the massacre as an aberration, and supporting the war effort. In contrast, Doves were 
more likely to interpret the massacre as evidence of American righteous illegitimacy in 
an anti-war framework. The newspaper executives and editors understood the climate in 
which they operated, and their business certainly benefitted from outrage and division. 
With this in mind, a proper examination of the source material can begin. 
Shock and disbelief characterize the reactions of many American civilians and 
officials after they heard of the My Lai Massacre in November 1969. “I find myself just 
sick,” Albert Baller wrote to the editor in the Boston Globe.84 The Chicago Tribune noted 
in late November that Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor stated, “It is difficult to 
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convey the feelings of shock and dismay which I and other civilian and military leaders 
of the army have experienced.”85 The Minneapolis Tribune conducted a statewide poll in 
December 1969 and discovered that almost half of the 600 people interviewed refused to 
believe that GIs committed mass murder at My Lai.86 Roughly forty percent were 
“horrified” after first hearing of the incident before deciding that it was a false report.87 
The fact that the news of the murder of hundreds of unarmed civilians by 
American GIs was unexpected and the refusal by some to believe its veracity suggest that 
many Americans viewed their military servicemen as incapable of performing these 
actions. As one anonymous Philadelphian stated, “I can’t believe our boys’ hearts are that 
rotten.”88 This could be dismissed as a one-off idiomatic saying if not for the fact that 
many individuals literally did not believe the massacre happened. Aside from the poll in 
the Minneapolis Tribune already mentioned, the statement of a Los Angeles salesman 
who talked to the Wall Street Journal in late November reads, “I don’t believe it actually 
happened. The story was planted by Vietcong sympathizers….”89  Indeed, while many in 
the antiwar movement were pushing back against traditional depictions of GIs, 
servicemen were still the ideal representatives of American morality and the bedrock of 
American exceptionalism. Civilians who questioned the troops’ morality were forced to 
question their own ideals, and some were unwilling to judge themselves. Russell Baker, a 
prominent journalist writing for the New York Times, declared that “nations, like people, 
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live by their illusions. Strip a man of all his illusions, and you destroy him.”90 The 
illusion of American righteousness—an adjunct to the notion of American exceptionalism 
as expressed by Kendrick Oliver—was reconciled in the media coverage of the My Lai 
Massacre.91 
For many, beliefs of American righteousness in the Vietnam War and 
exceptionalism fell away when they learned of the massacre at My Lai. President Lyndon 
Johnson began the war evoking the United States’ role as an arbiter of goodness and 
democracy that would help keep “the people and governments of all Southeast 
Asia…free from terror, subversion, and assassination.”92 Editors for the Los Angeles 
Times writing in late November 1969 echoed the sentiment that the United States was in 
the Vietnam War for “moral reasons,” insisting that Americans were “opposing a system 
that uses terror, brutality and indiscriminate killing as instruments of policy.”93 The 
hypocrisy with which the combat troops acted in the instance of the My Lai Massacre as 
arbiters of the values expressed by the US government—and American citizens as an 
extension—was “a staggering blow not simply to a particular cause but to the national 
conscience.”94 The virtuous reasons for entering the Vietnam War expressed by Johnson 
were corrupted by the actions of US soldiers at My Lai. Furthermore, their actions 
reflected on the values of the nation. Carl Rowan, the former head of the United States 
Information Agency, lamented in the Spokane Chronicle that revelations of the massacre 
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“stripped away whatever cloak of morality remained around our Vietnamese 
commitment.”95 The faith that Americans who were already unsure of their stance on the 
Vietnam War had in their moral righteousness as individuals and in collective pursuits of 
warfare waned. Vietnam was already a divisive topic in 1968, and the My Lai Massacre 
media coverage furthered anti-war sentiments by undermining the argument for morality 
in America’s interests.  
Antiwar proponents expressed the United States’ moral failing by comparing the 
My Lai Massacre to war crimes committed by the Nazis in World War II. Senator 
Stephen M. Young, a Democrat from Ohio, was shown combat photographer Ron 
Haeberle’s color slides of the My Lai victims (taken with his own camera, not the 
Army’s) with other congressmen. Senator Young declared the massacre “an act of 
brutality that cannot have been exceeded in Hitler’s time.”96 Average citizens, not just 
political officials, made this comparison. Hebert Glucksman from Lexington wrote to the 
editor of the Boston Globe that “the shame that the massacre of Lidice [the massacre of 
hundreds of civilians at a small Bohemian village by Nazis under orders from Adolf 
Hitler in 1942] brought to the German nation is now our shame, and who would have 
ever thought such a shame could come to America?”97 Another letter to the editor from 
Ronald Mallis asks, “Does Song My [one contemporary name for the My Lai Massacre] 
(or Hue) help us understand Hitler’s ‘Final Solution’?”98 Finally, John Scully, Jr., notes 
that “for twenty years we have reproached Germany with the question: ‘How could you 
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have let it happen?’” before he draws the somber conclusion, “Now we must ask 
ourselves how Song My could have happened in Vietnam.”99 In the consciousness of 
these American minds, the My Lai Massacre was definitive proof of a moral failure. They 
were ashamed of the evil enacted in their name on helpless victims, and in this shame 
their shared conviction of moral superiority collapsed. The atrocities committed by the 
Nazis represented the greatest evil humans could commit. Now, through the media 
coverage of My Lai, Americans confronted the reality that just because they were 
American, people in their society were not exempt from instigating atrocities. 
As the preconceptions of American moral righteousness dissipated for some, the 
questions arose for Glucksman and others, “Can we erase this blot from our national 
honor? We can punish the guilty. But who is guilty?”100 Some individuals accepted their 
responsibility for partaking in a society that generated citizens who committed atrocities. 
Representative Allard Lowenstein, a Democrat from New York and famous political 
activist, intimated at an Association for Student Governments meeting that Americans 
had a collective guilt for the My Lai Massacre: “We’re there to prevent a massacre. The 
only way to prevent massacres is to stop committing them.”101 Lowenstein’s thoughts on 
My Lai carried more weight than many average citizens and journalists due to his ability 
to influence policy and political thought. Rowan of the Spokane Chronicle asserted that 
“no sensitive American can absorb the ghoulish account of this massacre in My Lai 
hamlet without feeling a measure of personal guilt.”102 Rather than implicating Lt. Calley 
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as responsible for the massacre, one writer suggested that “the United States government 
is perhaps more responsible,” a government elected by its citizens.103 In a letter to the 
editor in the Boston Globe, Davis Luft from Cambridge expressed “moral outrage” at 
both “the government which gives our soldiers such tasks—and for ourselves, the citizens 
who permit it.”104 Luft accepted his responsibility for directing soldiers’ actions in 
Vietnam because of his role as a civilian in producing the democratic government that 
controls them. If incidents like the My Lai Massacre were to be avoided in the future, the 
whole of society had to take responsibility and guilt for the incident. Only then could they 
act collectively towards prevention. 
But acceptance of collective responsibility was not achieved by Americans 
broadly. A wider reckoning was stymied by counternarratives that upheld American 
righteousness and a refusal to sacrifice the image of the good GI following revelations of 
the My Lai Massacre. While antiwar doves—encompassing both average citizens and 
politician—compared the tragedy to atrocities committed by the Nazis, relinquished the 
idea of infallible American actions, and decided that accepting collective responsibility 
was the best course for reconciliation, hawks and proponents of American exceptionalism 
justified the massacre as morally righteous. When Baker spoke of nations and illusions, 
he also mentioned that “the illusion of our fundamental decency as a people may run 
even deeper among Americans than among most Westerners.”105 More conservative, 
hawkish, pro-military, and pro-Nixon Americans, often with ties to the military, refused 
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to let go of the myth of the good GI. American righteousness was too entangled with their 
identity, and they were unwilling to alter their paradigm. This segment of American 
society where illusions of the good GI penetrated deepest, therefore, did not accept public 
consternation toward its beloved icon. In his 1977 memoir, A Rumor of War, Philip 
Caputo describes the mythical icon of the good GI by invoking religious imagery. GIs 
were “knights” in Vietnam on a “crusade” of democracy, goodness, and righteousness 
against a global Communist evil.106 Following this point, Caputo explains, “There was 
nothing we could not do because we were Americans, and for the same reason, whatever 
we did was right.”107 At the time of the My Lai Massacre, conservative, pro-war 
Americans still believed this. 
Caputo’s depiction of the good GI represents the ideas held by those who 
rationalized the My Lai Massacre within its framework of an inability to do wrong. One 
Bostonian describing the incident proclaimed, “It was good,” before sarcastically 
remarking, “What do they give soldiers bullets for—to put in their pockets?”108 Shooting 
unarmed civilians, then, was acceptable within the framework that war required shooting 
people generally. A woman in Cleveland professed, “It sounds terrible to say we ought to 
kill kids, but many of our boys being killed over there are just kids too.”109 In this 
instance, the woman expressed a belief among hawks that the shootings of children were 
justified because young enlisted Americans were also dying in the Vietnam War.110 
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Civilians were not the only ones who defended the myth of the good GI. One 
troop claimed that the GIs at My Lai were not the perpetrators of unwarranted violence, 
but victims who were “hit hard before the action.”111 Another insisted, “There’s gotta be 
something missing,” indicating a refusal to believe the GIs at My Lai committed the 
massacre on a whim.112 Politicians also weighed in. Senator Ernest Hollings, a Democrat 
from South Carolina, conflated the My Lai Massacre with an accident and implied that 
accidental civilian deaths were an acceptable part of military operations when he asked 
the Senate, “Are we going to take every helicopter pilot and B52 pilot who makes a 
mistake and call him a murderer?”113 Indeed, White House Press Secretary Ronald 
Ziegler was mistaken when he insisted that the My Lai Massacre was “abhorrent to the 
conscience of all the American people.”114 It was abhorrent to doves and proponents of 
the antiwar movement, but hawks found ways to incorporate the massacre into their 
cherished myths of American exceptionalism and the good GI. 
To hawkish defenders of the good GI image, moral culpability rested with officers 
and officials rather than combat troops. Paul David Meadlo, one of the perpetrators of the 
My Lai Massacre ordered to fire on civilians by Lt. Calley, told the story of how he shot 
civilians at My Lai on CBS in an interview with Mike Wallace on November 24, 1969.115 
When J. Anthony Lukas visited Meadlo’s hometown of New Goshen, Indiana, and 
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questioned residents about who he was and how he was perceived, Robert Hale, a pool 
hall owner, responded, “How can you newspaper people blame Paul David? He was 
under orders. He had to do what his officer told him.”116 Another resident, Dee Henry, 
affirmed Hale’s disgust at the insinuation that Meadlo was responsible, “Anybody who’s 
had any affiliation with the service knows you do what you’re ordered to do—no 
questions asked.”117  
Even perpetrators of the massacre defended their actions or put the blame on their 
superiors. In an interview on the Huntley-Brinkley Report, Private First Class Vernardo 
Simpson, a perpetrator of the My Lai killings, insisted that he was “reluctant, but I was 
following a direct order” when he murdered a man, woman, and child “about 2 years 
old.”118 For soldiers and conservative citizens who maintained the good GI myth, then, 
following orders was a part of being a good, competent GI. The onus of morality was 
placed elsewhere, on individuals like Lt. Calley, and did not indicate a broader moral 
failure of the American GI or American society. To “put the blame on the American 
people” was “one of the most sickening of knee-jerk reactions” according to the 
conservative, pro-war Chicago Tribune, “The charge that American troops generally have 
been ‘brutalized’ by the war is a contemptible lie.”119 Believing in the good GI was a 
method of avoiding the self-reflection liberal doves saw as a necessary step toward 
moving past the massacre. 
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Institutions in American society also officially conformed to myths of the good GI 
and American righteousness to reinforce the “confidence and integrity” of the military 
that, as one reporter put it at the time, “has been so buffeted in recent months.”120 Nixon’s 
Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, attempting to protect Nixon after revelations of the My 
Lai Massacre, urged citizens that “this incident should not be allowed to reflect on the 
some million and a quarter young Americans who have now returned to the United States 
after having served in Vietnam with great courage and distinction.”121 “The United States 
government does not condone atrocities in any way, at any time, under any conditions,” 
read a joint statement from the US embassy and US military command in Saigon.122 One 
senior officer in the Army mirrored the official joint statement in his own, “The Army as 
an institution doesn’t put up with this kind of wanton killing.”123 He continues, “If it did, 
we’d have dozens of instances of this happening all over Vietnam over the past four 
years. It hasn’t happened.”124 The government and the military protected their image as 
righteous institutions and defended the image of the good GI by arguing that My Lai was 
an aberration. 
But My Lai was only an aberration in the number of civilians killed, not in its 
occurrence as an atrocity. Many GIs testified to committing or seeing the “systematic use 
of electrical torture, beatings, and in some cases, murder of men, women and children, by 
their military units in Vietnam.”125 According to Howard Jones, the Vietnam War Crimes 
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Working Group—a once-classified archive assembled by a Pentagon task force in the 
early 1970s after revelations of the My Lai Massacre—show there were over 300 
allegations of murder and assault during the Vietnam War.126 The Pentagon’s 
documentation of these incidences indicate some shift in attention toward the problem of 
atrocities in the military. But incidents unveiled by the Vietnam War Crimes Working 
Group not only happened in Vietnam. They also occurred in the Pacific War and the 
Korean War.127 The Army as an institution, then, did tolerate routine atrocities, and it had 
for some time. Vernardo Simpson even implicated MACV’s search-and-destroy policy as 
a direct cause of the My Lai Massacre: “We had orders to search and destroy 
everything…We searched the huts…If there was anything in there, well, we was to 
destroy it and everything.”128 Still, a mother eating at a restaurant with her son learned of 
the My Lai Massacre and proclaimed to the Miami Herald, “That’s a terrible thing and he 
knows nothing [about it].”129 Yet there she was, sending her son to fight in Vietnam 
where acts like My Lai occurred. Did Americans really not understand what their soldiers 
were doing—and had been doing—overseas for thirty years? The public response to the 
My Lai Massacre indicates that some did not. What about those within the military? 
What about veterans, or their civilian friends and families? 
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The media coverage of My Lai reveals that in military circles especially, atrocities 
were well known. One sergeant on base at Fort Benning, Georgia, questioned by a 
reporter for the Miami Herald in late November 1969 about Lt. Calley’s involvement in 
the massacre stated, “This happens all the time over there, but just not this many people 
at one time…most soldiers over there don’t give a damn for the Vietnamese.”130 Dennis 
Stout, a former Army paratroop sergeant, said to the Arizona Republic in December 1969 
that the prosecution of Lt. Calley was the Army’s way of hiding that “this goes on and is 
not prohibited.”131 On atrocities, Stout insisted, “They could stop it,” but they refuse to.132 
A draftee at Fort Benning also interviewed by the Miami Herald in November 1969 
summed up the generalized understanding among GIs, “Look, war is war…If people are 
going to try to pretend that there is such a thing as a clean war or a pretty war, that’s 
ridiculous.”133 Under this pretense, atrocities were excused by those in the military who 
knew they existed. Even if there was a general knowledge that acts described by the 
Vietnam War Crimes Working Group were wrong in peacetime, they were accepted as 
what happened in war, not something to be actively prevented during war. Therefore, 
atrocities did not reflect on the good GI image in military circles. 
While many combat troops were familiar with atrocities occurring in Vietnam 
before My Lai, the American public broadly was ignorant of specific atrocities US troops 
committed in Asia as evidenced by initial shock to revelations of the My Lai Massacre. 
But that ignorance was not the product of accident. Partially, it resulted from both 
 
130 Quoted in Jones, “‘Most GIs Don’t Give.’” 
131 Quoted in Associated Press, “Student Tells of Atrocity: Says Deaths Common, Unchecked,” 
Arizona Republic, Dec. 13, 1969, 
https://www.newspapers.com/image/8672274/?terms=my%2Blai%2Bmassacre%2Bpublic%2Bopinion. 
132 Associated Press, “Student Tells of Atrocity.” 
133 Jones, “‘Most GIs Don’t Give.’” 
38 
 
voluntary and involuntary media censorship in the Pacific War and Korean War that 
laxed during the Vietnam War.134 Another cause of ignorance, however, was a culture of 
silence in American society that relegated discussion of American atrocities to smaller, 
normally military circles. It took the media, ensconced in a heated and divisive debate 
about a morally-questionable war, even before the My Lai Massacre, to break the culture 
of silence that existed in the United States around these atrocities. 
The culture of silence among GIs, reinforced by civilians who insisted GIs not 
talk about any atrocities they committed, is evident in the negative reactions to GIs 
discussing the My Lai Massacre publicly. Ronald Ridenhour noted that, before he talked 
openly about the massacre, his family and friends urged him to keep the stories of My Lai 
to himself.135 The reasons Ridenhour says he did stay silent for over a year are the same 
reasons why his family and friends recommend he not publicize them. Initially, he had no 
desire to “besmirch the image of the American service man.”136 Ridenhour could not 
reconcile the event with the myths of American righteousness and the good GI he 
assumed he was. Instead, he let those myths fade, “It was a reflection on me, on every 
American, on the ideals that we supposedly represent. It completely castrated the whole 
picture of America.”137 When Paul Meadlo revealed his part in the My Lai Massacre to 
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Mike Wallace on CBS, people from his hometown were not concerned with his role in 
the killings. Rather, they were concerned that he broke a culture of silence by publicizing 
it. Dee Henry, a resident of Meadlo’s hometown and associate, declared, “The only thing 
I blame Paul David for was talking about this to everybody on television.”138 Henry 
continues, “Things like that happen in war. They always have…But only just recently 
have people started telling the press about it. It's bad enough to have to kill people 
without telling everybody about it.”139 Those who knew Meadlo and those close to 
Ridenhour pressured them to stay silent about the massacre or were upset that they talked 
at all. Both examples show that the culture of silence among GIs was reinforced by 
civilian associates who suppressed discussion and disapproved of GIs speaking of their 
experiences publicly. 
Consternation for breaking the culture of silence did not just come from those 
who knew the perpetrators before My Lai. Coverage of the My Lai Massacre in 
mainstream news outlets forced a national conversation around the event, and defenders 
of American righteousness and the good GI lambasted the media for breaking the story 
and, in the process, the culture of silence. “I don’t know of anybody in the Army that 
feels like this [the revelation and discussion of My Lai] is a good thing for the Army or 
the country,” one GI returning from Vietnam claimed. Reconciliation was not “good” to 
him or those he described because their image—and the image of the institution they 
served—was tarnished in the process.140 Journalist Seymour Hersh discovered that over 
eighty percent of 250 telephone calls received by the Cleveland Plain Dealer the day it 
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revealed Ron Haeberle’s photographs of My Lai victims were upset that the paper 
published them.141 One caller judged, “Your paper is rotten and anti-American,” while 
another asked, “How can I explain these pictures to my children?”142 Furthermore, Hersh 
reports that all but two of 110 phone calls Mike Wallace received following his interview 
of Paul Meadlo on November 24, 1969 were “abusive.”143 Senator Peter Dominick, a 
Republican from Colorado, said of Wallace’s interview, “When we find ordinarily 
responsible networks and newspapers…participating in this, there just is no justification 
for it. What kind of country have we got when this sort of garbage can be spread 
around?”144 
Why were some Americans upset that their media was finally reporting on 
atrocities committed by GIs overseas against civilians, and why were they not thankful to 
the media for bringing My Lai to their attention? Answers can be inferred from the 
woman’s question of how she would explain the photographs to her children. She would 
have to explain that Americans are not always righteous in their actions. They commit 
atrocities like any other country’s people. American troops, she would need to say, are 
not perfect and do not always do good things. In fact, they have often committed evil 
deeds like the one in My Lai. In these ways, America and Americans are not so 
exceptional. She and Americans like her, however, believed in myths that defied these 
truths and rejected reality.
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In the United States, news coverage of the My Lai Massacre contributed to an 
ongoing discussion on morality in war. The reality of atrocities committed by GIs 
overseas collided with long-held myths of American moral righteousness and the image 
of the good GI. The media was the vehicle for this collision, and its coverage of My Lai 
broke a culture of silence around atrocities. For some Americans—particularly liberal 
doves and those unsure of the war effort in Vietnam before My Lai—reconciliation was 
achieved, their perceptions of a country and a military with infallible morals faded, and 
they implored the rest of society to accept collective responsibility for the horrors 
committed in America’s name. Their conservative, hawkish, pro-military opponents, 
however, incorporated the My Lai Massacre into the belief that America was righteous in 
its actions abroad, excusing GIs for their actions in far-off lands. As of the year 2020, the 
evils of atrocities from twentieth-century American-Asian wars have been regularly 
rediscovered while new atrocities have been uncovered in twenty-first century wars in the 
Middle East. Two examples include the CIA “enhanced interrogation” (torture) of 
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and the torture of Iraqi detainees by Army soldiers during 
the Iraq War. 145 But their existence fails to undermine persistent notions of American 
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exceptionalism in American society, a conclusion that aligns with observations made by 
Kendrick Oliver.146 
The myths persisted after My Lai’s initial revelation to the public because the 
military was forced, under media scrutiny, to prosecute Lt. Calley and twenty-five others 
for the incident. Lt. Calley’s prosecution was evidence to the Miami Herald that the 
Army was “living up to its best traditions in the most difficult of circumstances.”147 
Whether the atrocities occurred or not became irrelevant. Actions were being taken by the 
Army—and as an extension, by the American people—to right the wrong. “Every 
American has the right to be proud of its conduct in the dismal affair known as My Lai,” 
the Miami Herald concluded in March 1970.148 Atrocities, if noticed and punished in 
even a symbolic way (that is, not everyone who participated was punished at all or to the 
fullest extent of the law), now fit neatly into the myth of American exceptionalism. 
But the punishment dealt by the military for My Lai did not fit the crime of the 
murder of over 500 unarmed South Vietnamese civilians. Only Lt. Calley was convicted, 
and only of the murder of twenty-two villagers. He was given a life sentence, but 
President Nixon removed him from prison and placed him on house arrest at Fort 
Benning on April 1, 1970, three days after his conviction. Secretary of the Army Howard 
H. Callaway commuted Calley’s sentence to ten years in 1974, and Calley was paroled 
the same year. To summarize the totality of the punishment for those responsible for the 
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My Lai Massacre: Lt. Calley served less than four years, most of that under house 
arrest.149 
By comparison, Lieutenant General Yamashita, Japanese commander of the 
Philippines during World War II, was convicted at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in 
1946 and hung for “condoning atrocities” even though, according to the Miami Herald 
reporting in December 1945 after Yamashita was found guilty, he “never once was 
accused of personally having harmed anyone nor of having witnessed any” atrocities.150 
It was assumed that he should have known atrocities happened under those whom he 
commanded, and this was enough to be held accountable. The Army failed to punish the 
actions of combat troops, as well as officers like Lt. Calley, who committed atrocities. By 
extension, the American people failed to hold their troops, their military institutions, and 
the federal government accountable. Americans held themselves to a different standard, 
one where American exceptionalism allowed for understanding and acceptance of 
atrocities. 
The past informs more recent conflicts, showing that the contradictions of 
American exceptionalism and wartime atrocities remain unresolved. In 2004, during the 
Iraq War, CBS News published photographs showing that US soldiers committed 
atrocities by abusing Iraqi prisoners in the prison known as Abu Ghraib.151 After the 
incident was made public, the then deputy director of coalition operations in Iraq, 
Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, told the American public at the time that the 
perpetrators constituted “a small minority of the military, and No. 2, they need to 
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understand that is not the Army. The Army is a values-based organization. We live by 
our values…these acts that you see in these pictures may reflect the actions of 
individuals, but by God, it doesn't reflect my army.”152 Collective societal reckoning 
remains elusive after My Lai. War atrocities continue without recognition that the 
institution of the Army is responsible for the continuation of these atrocities. American 
society, in tandem, fails to hold the Army accountable. The Army still portrays itself as a 
symbol of the inherently moral values that permeate American society. Kimmitt made 
this statement because he understands that many Americans still subscribe to the myth of 
exceptionalism. If Americans do not collectively accept responsibility for atrocities 
committed by US soldiers overseas, reinterpret their role in regulating the actions of 
combat troops, and reshape the military as an institution for enacting foreign policy 
through violence abroad, atrocities overseas will continue as a product of the institution. 
Regardless of precise answers on how to dramatically curb instances of atrocities in 
warfare, the status quo is insufficient. 
 What has changed, then, as a consequence of the media coverage and public 
reaction to the My Lai Massacre? Conversations about American atrocities overseas and 
how they implicate American citizens and national identity are being had on a national 
level—on television networks like CBS News and mainstream newspapers like the New 
York Times—rather than among segmented groups of veterans and their close associates. 
The media, in reporting on the My Lai Massacre, broke a trend—a culture of silence. 
When discovered, war crimes like the one at Abu Ghraib in 2004 become major 
headlines and topics of discussion in American society. This discussion allows for enemy 
 




combatants to be humanized and the violence and consequences of warfare to be 
considered as the Vietnam War was for Ronald Mallis of Boston who wrote in a letter to 
the editor of the Boston Globe after reading about the My Lai Massacre,  
The massacre of civilians at Song My particularizes a war in which “atrocity” had 
just been another word, in which events, people, the language itself, all had been 
nothing more than their electronic images. We had forgotten, in the flood of body-
counts, what it means for people to murder other people. But now suddenly we 
are made aware of definitions and ramifications....153 
 
Attempts at collective reckoning and the eradication of myths about American 
righteousness and the good GI have been made thanks to the media providing a platform, 
but those attempts have not yet been successful. If the discussion of atrocities in 
American society continues to affect hearts and minds like Mallis’, however, those myths 
may one day be overturned. 
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